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DICTA

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Colorado State Board of Examiners of Architects v. Rico': Equity
Will Not Enjoin the Enforcement of an Unconstitutional Statute

By

JoHN CORBRIDGE

John Corbridge: B. S. (Business), University of Colorado, 1950;
LL. B. cum laude, University of Denver, 1956; admitted as a
certified public accountant in Colorado, 1954; admitted to the
Colorado bar, 1956; former President of the College of Law
Board of Governors; member of Order of St. Ives; Phi Delta
Phi and Omicron Delta Kappa.
The plaintiff in this case sought a declaratory judgment and an
injunction prohibiting the Board from acting to interfere with his
practice of architecture. As a basis for such relief, the plaintiff alleged that the licensing statute was unconstitutional. The judgment
of the trial court granting the relief prayed for by the plaintiff was
reversed by the Supreme Court. Justice Moore's opinion held that
it was improper to grant injunctive relief against the enforcement
of an unconstitutional statute.
This doctrine was first announced as the Colorado law in the
case of Denver v. Beede.2 The basis of the rule, then as now, is that
equity will grant relief only where there is no plain, speedy and
adquate relief at law. That doctrine is undisputed. The problem
lies in its application and the definition of what will constitute a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.
The jurisdiction of equity would appear to be a matter of state
law, even where it is alleged that a statute violates the Constitution
of the United States. Still the instant case is squarely in conflict with
the rule as announced in Truax v. Raich 3 by the Supreme Court of
t
Cola.----... .
; 289 P. 2nd 162 (1955). See also:
Olympic A. C. v. Speer, 29 Colo. 158.
Canon City v. Maning, 43 Colo. 144, 95 P. 537 (1908).
Brunstein v. City of Fort Collins, 53 Colo. 254, P. 119 (1912).
Farmers' Dairy League, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 112 Colo. 399, 149 P. 2nd 370
(1944).
Walker v. Begole, 99 Colo. 471, 63 P. 2nd, 1224 (1937).
Denver v. Thrailkill, 112 Colo. 488, 244 P. 2nd 1074 (1952).
2 25 Colo. 172, 54 P. 624 (1898).
239 U. S. 33 (1915); see also Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railroad Co., 305 U. S. 176 (1938).
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the United States. This case was an action to enjoin the threatened
enforcement of a state statute prohibiting the employment of more
than a stated number of aliens. The plaintiff was an alien employee
whose job was at stake. The reasoning of that opinion is applicable
to the Colorado decision. Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
"It is also settled that while a court of equity, generally
speaking, has no jurisdiction over the prosecution, the punishment or the pardon of crimes or misdemeanors a distinction obtains, and equitable jurisdiction exists to restrain
criminal prosecutions under unconstitutional enactments,
when the prevention of such prosecutions is essential to the
safeguarding of rights of property. The right to earn a livelihood and to continue in employment unmolested by efforts to enforce void enactments should be similarly entitled to protection in the absence of an adequate remedy at
law."
It may be contended that the Truax case should be distinguished
since it was the employer rather than the plaintiff-worker who was
subject to prosecution on violation of the unconstitutional statute.
The later United States Supreme Court decision in Terrace v.
Thompson4 settles any such contention. The Court specifically held
in the Terrace case that defending a criminal prosecution is not a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.
Any discussion of this problem would be incomplete without
mention, of the leading case of Ex Parte Young.5 That decision enjoined the enforcement of a railroad rate violation of which would
subject one to a penalty of a fine up to a maximum of $5,000.00.
The Court held that when the penalties for disobedience of a
statute of this nature are so severe as to intimidate one from resorting to the courts to test its validity, the statute in itself constitutes a deprivation of equal protection of the laws. This doctrine
binds state courts since it rests upon the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U. S. Constitution.
As a practical matter, the penalties imposed by the architectual
act which was in force at the time of the Rico decision 6 were sufficiently large to preclude a test of the statute by criminal prosecution. Penalties were set at fines up to $200.00 per day.
That a defense of criminal prosecution is not a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy at law is established by the Terrace case, at
least for the federal courts. Under Chief Justice Holmes' decision
in the Truax case, the right to pursue one's livelihood is a property
right and equity should enjoin enforcement of a statute which unconstitutionally restricts such property right, even though the
statute provides criminal punishment for violations. Further, this
type of statute may well be a deprivation of equal protection under
the doctrine of Ex Parte Young.
4 263 U. S. 107 (1923).
5 209 U. S. 123 (1908).
6 1953 C. R. S. 10-1-15.
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Attorneys: Privilege of Taking Bar Examination Can Be Taken
Away If Applicant Can't Satisfy Board of Bar Examiners of His
Moral Qualities.
By

BERNARD

H.

THORN

Bernard H. Thorn is a senior at the University of Denver College
of Law. He received the B.S. in Law from the University of
Denver in 1955. A member of Phi Delta Phi, he has also served
on the College of Law Board of Governors.

The case of Rudolph Schware vs. Board of Bar Examiners of
the State of New Mexico, which was recently decided in our neighboring jurisdiction, is one that seems bound to provide much
controversy.' The petitioner applied to take the bar examination
in February, 1954; his petition was denied and a rehearing was
granted in July of the same year. At the conclusion of the second
hearing it was agreed that the first opinion should stand.
The facts are very clearly stated in the opinion. It appeared
that the applicant used several Italian aliases, which in light of
the fact that he was a Jew seeking employment in a predominantly
Italian industry does not shock one's conscience. The petitioner
was planning to organize the Italian employees in the plant in
which he had secured work into a labor organization, which in
time he did. He also used an alias on a similar occasion in California
when working at a shipyard there; when he was arrested along with
two or three thousand others during a labor dispute he gave the
police another alias for fear of losing his job.
In 1940 the applicant was arrested in Detroit, Michigan, for
violating the Neutrality Act of 1918. He was recruiting troops to
fight for the loyalists in the Spanish Civil War. This charge was
nol-prossed. The applicant was arrested once again in Texas when
he was driving a friend's car from Michigan to California. There
were no charges filed against him and he continued on his way.
One must be mindful of the fact that he has never been convicted
of any crime.
An important point the Court treated with due concern was
the applicant's former membership in the Communist Party. He
belonged to the Young Communist League in his senior year of
high school. In 1934 he joined the Communist Party and remained
a member until 1937. He dropped out of the party for a short time,
then returned, remaining until 1940. He quit the party, disillusioned
with its aims and leadership.
The Court was apparently aware of the different connotation
the Communist Party had in the 1930's when the applicant was a
member, which, indeed, is far from the view we hold of the party
today.
The Court noted a simple statement which the applicant enclosed in a letter to his new bride while on board a boat to the
Pacific Theater of operation during the second World War:
1 I. Schware vs. Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 304, 291 P. 2d 607.
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"Jim Crow is on a par with anti-semitism, anti-Catholicism,
and anti-Communism. In a democracy one cannot discriminate against a minority."
In the same letter the applicant wrote that all "antis" are:
most dangerous and stupid mistakes for Americans to
make. They violate Christian ethics as well as all other
ethical principles that recognize the brotherhood of man.
To top it all off consider them immoral."
The Court, I presume, thought this language indicative of a
failure to really repudiate the party or its ideology. This is a very
logical conclusion taken without the knowledge that the petitioner
was recently married and may have been trying to impress his
bride with his philosophical attributes.
When applying to take the Bar examination the applicant
was unable to give all of his addresses since he was sixteen, which
were required on his application. It is doubtful if many people
could remember all of their addresses over a twenty-four year
period if they had moved as much as the applicant.
When in 1950 the petitioner enrolled in the law school of the
University of New Mexico he discussed with the Dean his former
affiliation with the Communist Party. The Dean and the petitioner
both felt that his activities wouldn't be a great obstacle in his path
since they had occurred many years previously.
The Court was aware of the petitioner's good repute among
his fellow students. While going to law school he started an anonymous scholarship for needy law students. He received letters from
teachers, fellow students and business associates attesting his good
moral character when he sought admission to the bar. In affirming
the Board of Bar Examiners' conclusion, the Court stated:
"We take no pleasure in the duty we have had to perform
for no man is all good or all bad. The record on which this
decision is based came from the petitioner himself who
presently enjoys good repute among his teachers, his fellow
students and associates and in his Synagogue. But our obligation to the Bar of this state knows no compromise. Petitioner has sought an office difficult to obtain and difficult
to serve."
The cases are numerous, too, which hold that by asking admission into the legal profession an applicant places his good moral
character directly in issue and bears the burden of proof as to
that issue.The case of Re Wells, supra, brought out the fact that the
conditions and burdens of proof are not the same for a disbarment
procedure as they are for the admission to the bar.
2 Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183, 294 p. 697, 72 ALR 923 (1930); In Re Wells, 174 Cal. 467, 163
p. 657 (1917); In re Weinstein, 150 Ore. 1, 42 Pac. 2d. 744.
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The law seems to be well settled on the requirements for
admission to the bar and we find the Court saying in a North
Carolina case, 3
"'This upright character' prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive license
to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must,
in addition to other requisites, satisfy the Court, includes
all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It
is something more than an absence of bad character. It is
a good name which the applicant has acquired, through
association with his fellows. It means that he must have
conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily
would, should or does. Such character expresses itself, not
in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance,
but quite often in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it
is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it
is wrong..."
The Court said the applicant had not convinced them that he
was a man of good moral character such as that required for the
holding of the office of attorney in the State of New Mexico. While
some might, no doubt, feel that the applicant was denied due process
by this decision, it has been established by a long list of cases that
the right to practice law is4 not a constitutional one. We find the
Court saying In Re Greer,
"The right to practice law is not a natural nor constitutional
one in the sense that the right to engage in the ordinary
avocations of life, such as farming, the industrial trades and
the mercantile business. It has always been considered a
privilege only, bestowed upon certain persons primarily for
the benefit of society."
In a recent Florida case the Court said in dictum that while
membership in the Communist Party was enough in itself to sustain
a disbarment it was still incumbent upon the State to prove membership, and the mere invoking of the Fifth Amendment was not
in itself evidence of membership.-,
If membership in the party is in itself grounds for disbarment,
then in the requirement for admission, where the slightest blur on
one's character is sufficient to keep him from admission, merely
previous membership might suffice to deny admission.
There is. no doubt that loyalty to the Constitution is an inalienable condition to a lawyer's service as an officer of the Court.
Communist Party membership is incompatible with this loyalty.'
It would seem in this case that even though one has led an
impeccable existence for a number of years, it is still incumbent
upon an applicant for the position of attorney in society to show
an almost flawless character from the age of responsibility.
3 In

re Farmer, 191 N. C. 235, 131 S. E. 661.
In Re Greer, 52 Ariz. 385, 81 P. 2d 96; Re Lavin, 59 Idaho 191, 81 Pac. 2d 727.
S.E..
.
r Sheiner vs. State, 24 L.W. 1041,
e In Re Anastopo, 3 III. 2d. 471, 121 N.E. 2d. 826.
4

